Gulsen, Mustafa Alpin2026-01-242026-01-2420232587-151Xhttps://doi.org/10.30784/epfad.1147699https://search.trdizin.gov.tr/tr/yayin/detay/1162427https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12868/5346The theoretical abstract structure of the regulations emerges as a phenomenal reality, with the phenomenon of regulator capitalism. In this context, regulator capitalism refers to the transformation of the relationship between society and the state into a business-state relationship with a different division of labor structure. This indicates that global regulators play an active role in the provision of global public goods and services. In the study, the public organization model transformed by regulator capitalism is handled as a transition from bureaucracy to regulocracy. This failure of regulator capitalism is examined in the framework of the regulator capture in this study. While regulocracy refers to the social layer of the new system, which consists of experts and has universal solutions, the regulator capture states that the regulating companies will evolve into the regulator position after aAwhile. While this structure of regulatory capitalism reveals aAnew division of labor, it also obscures the accountability of public services between society and the state. Such ambiguity has caused representative democracy to be replaced by indirect representative democracy. AsAa result, the public sector has moved away from public financial management principles such as transparency and accountability.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPublic GoodRegulatory CapitalismRegulocracyRegulatory CaptureArticle10.30784/epfad.114769981831011162427WOS:001343458800005Q4